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INTRODUCTION
The radio frequency spectrum is a highly regu-
lated resource whose management is usually
deferred to a government agency in most coun-
tries. The tasks related to spectrum management
encompass all the activities related to regulating
this resource, including spectrum allocation and
assignment of spectrum as well as regulation
enforcement activities. For our purposes, spec-
trum allocation refers to defining acceptable
uses of certain bands (e.g., FM radio), whereas
spectrum assignment is the process of granting
rights to particular users in a band that has been
allocated (e.g., a radio station).
Traditional spectrum allocation and assign-
ment mechanisms have focused on avoiding
interference between users and on the type of
use given to spectrum rather than on the effi-
cient use of spectrum and the maximization of
economic benefits. Due to this, most of the spec-
trum is used suboptimally most of the time with
low average occupancy values (less than 10 per-
cent as reported in [1]).
Additionally, managing spectrum has become
increasingly difficult for regulatory agencies due to
the new technologies and uses for spectrum that
are continuously emerging and placing increasing
demands on this resource. Thus, more flexible
assignment mechanisms have to be put in place to
adjust to this new reality while still achieving the
best usage of spectrum possible under economic
or social welfare considerations [2].
Spectrum auctions have become a common
technique for regulatory agencies to assign spec-
trum to new users. Once the auction is over,
however, the license holders do not get feedback
about the current valuation of spectrum. For
economically driven spectrum assignment to be
optimally effective, a secondary market must
exist that allows spectrum users to optimally
choose between capital investment and spectrum
use on a continuous basis, not just at the time of
initial assignment [2]. The interactions in the
market should take into account the geographic
reusability and non-perishable characteristics of
spectrum, which make its trading different than
trading traditional market commodities.
Unlike much of the dynamic spectrum assign-
ment (DSA) literature, which focuses on non-
cooperative sharing, spectrum trading is a form
of primary cooperative spectrum sharing that
involves permanent license transfers for econom-
ic consideration [3]. Thus, it assigns spectrum to
those who value it most, allowing for the estab-
lishment of dynamic market-driven and competi-
tive wireless communication markets.
Spectrum trading markets are of growing
interest to many spectrum management agen-
cies. They are motivated by their desire to
increase the use of market-based mechanisms
for spectrum management to increase spectrum
efficiency. The research reported here is, in
many ways, a best case analysis to determine the
viability of those markets.
PARTICIPANTS IN A
SPECTRUM TRADING MARKET
To understand the organization of and interac-
tions in a spectrum trading (ST) market, we
need to know what entities participate in such a
market. In [4] we elaborated a classification for
market structures that support ST. This classifi-
cation considered two main types of market
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structures for spectrum trading: over-the-counter
(OTC) markets and exchange-based market
operation. We focus on the exchange-based case
in this article.
Figure 1 illustrates an exchange-based trading
scenario. In this scenario the exchange collects
the offers to sell and offers to buy (bids) spec-
trum, determines the winning bid, and transfers
the spectrum usage right from the selling spec-
trum user to the new owner of that right. The
entities that participate in exchange-based ST
markets are the following.
SPECTRUM EXCHANGE
An entity that provides and maintains a market-
place or facilities for bringing together buyers
and sellers of spectrum in which spectrum trad-
ing transactions can take place. It also publicizes
prices and anonymizes trading entities.
SPECTRUM USER
An entity that uses spectrum for a particular
purpose. A spectrum user (SU) might be acting
in one of the following roles at a given moment
in time:
• Spectrum license holder (SLH): An entity
that owns a spectrum license and offers it
for trading in exchange for financial com-
pensation. This entity can be a wireless ser-
vice provider, market maker, or spectrum
exchange that has been assigned a spectrum
trading band by a regulatory agency. In
general, SLHs hold spectrum for specula-
tion or for their own use.
• Spectrum license requestor (SLR): An enti-
ty that submits bids for spectrum licenses to
the ST market with the intent to acquire
the license. SLRs obtain spectrum for spec-
ulation or their own use. An entity that acts
as an SLR can be a wireless service
provider, market maker, or company/enter-
prise that acquires spectrum on behalf of
another.
SPECTRUM REGULATOR
A spectrum regulator is a government entity that
oversees the ST market and defines the regula-
tions for its operation. It is also responsible for
maintaining a spectrum availability and assign-
ment database which is updated every time a
spectrum trade is completed to register the iden-
tity of the new holder of spectrum.
MARKET MAKERS
A market maker facilitates trading; it does not
provide services with its inventory. It acts as a
dealer that holds an inventory of spectrum and
stands ready to trade when an SLR (buyer) or
SLH (seller) desires. It gets revenue through the
spread between the sell and buy prices for spec-
trum, and holds a spectrum inventory for negoti-
ating and speculating.
EXCHANGE-BASED ST MARKETS
In exchange-based ST markets, the spectrum
exchange is the central entity for market opera-
tion. In general, an exchange denotes the idea of
a central facility where buyers and sellers can
transact and which may charge fees for its ser-
vices. In the traditional sense, an exchange is
usually involved in the delivery of the product.
For a spectrum exchange to allow use of traded
spectrum, the required devices do not need to be
collocated in the exchange, so the exchange
might not be involved in the delivery of service.
We assume that spectrum exchanges make use
of continuous double auctions as a mechanism
to match buyers and sellers.
We consider that the spectrum exchange acts
as a pooling point (POOL) if its facilities house
the communication equipment that enable the
delivery of wireless services through spectrum
acquired by a buyer in the exchange. This kind
of exchange also takes care of the configuration
of equipment required to make the spectrum
usable to the new license holder. A non-pooling
point exchange (NOPOOL) only delivers the
authorization for use of spectrum to the buying
party in a spectrum trade. The new SLH must
then use this authorization to configure its
devices to make use of the spectrum it has just
acquired.
From a functional perspective a spectrum
exchange can be a band manager (BM) for a
given segment of spectrum over a region or have
no band manager functionality (NOBM). BM
exchanges support-leasing arrangements in addi-
tion to permanent license transfers. In contrast
to BM exchanges, a NOBM exchange will only
facilitate the trading of spectrum among entities
in the market without holding any spectrum
inventory itself.
For scenarios where the exchange has BM
functionality, SLRs send a request for spectrum
to the exchange, which, if possible, will assign
spectrum to the requesting entity in the form of
a timed lease within the band managed by the
exchange. For a NOBM exchange the spectrum
it will handle for trading will come from market
participants that use the exchange and make
bids and offers of spectrum. It is worth mention-
ing that unless the market has defined a basic
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Figure 1. Spectrum trading scenario.
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amount of bandwidth as a spectrum-trading unit,
it will be very complicated to match bids and
offers of spectrum without incurring wasteful
assignment of this resource. Although giving a
particular structure to the way a spectrum-trad-
ing band should be segmented will limit its oper-
ational flexibility, it also provides benefits in
terms of simplifying the specifications to charac-
terize a particular spectrum trade and managing
interference between ST users.
From the previous discussion, the proposed
classification generates four types of spectrum
exchanges that can be used to implement an ST
market. These are listed in Table 1.
MODELING OF ST MARKETS
We use agent-based computational economics
(ACE) to analyze spectrum trading markets and
the behaviors of their participants which, given
their variety, would be difficult to study with
conventional statistical and analytical tools. ACE
is “the computational study of economic process-
es modeled as dynamic systems of interacting
agents” [5]. An agent in an ACE model is a soft-
ware entity with defined data and behavior.
Agents can represent individuals, institutions,
firms, and physical entities. ACE methods have
been used to study cooperative secondary spec-
trum sharing (in which temporary usage rights
are negotiated) [6].
A spectrum trading market modeling tool
(SPECTRAD) has been developed as part of
our research work, and makes use of ACE meth-
ods and concepts. With this tool, we model the
participants in a ST market over a set of differ-
ent scenarios. Our focus is to determine the con-
ditions for viability of these markets. We define
a viable spectrum trading market as one that
possesses good liquidity and sustainability char-
acteristics. As a first step in our analysis we have
chosen to examine spectrum markets where only
one wireless standard is used, and the unit seg-
ments of tradable frequency have equal opera-
tional conditions (fungibility). Future work will
examine more complicated and realistic scenar-
ios. This is the best case scenario for liquidity.
When modeling markets, the agents repre-
senting market participants have limited (if any)
knowledge of the decisions and state of other
market participants (bounded rationality). Agents
adapt their behavior based on their goals, and
their interaction with the market and/or other
agents. In ACE modeling, once initial conditions
have been specified, the evolution of the model is
only dependent on the interactions among agents,
and given the diversity of interactions that can
arise, it is difficult to perform straightforward
causal analysis by tracking one market partici-
pant. Thus, ACE models provide a tool to
observe the aggregate behaviors that emerge on
a system from the individual behaviors of its
components (agents). Analysis of these behaviors
over several scenarios can provide insights into
characteristics of new markets, the effect of eco-
nomic policies, and the roles of institutions.
By characterizing the trading, information
overhead, and infrastructure costs of different
ST market implementation architectures, and
since we are interested in the running behavior
(sustainability) of the market once its operating
infrastructure has been put in place, we find that
the only differentiating factor between them is
whether the exchange is organized to work as a
band manager (BM) or not (NOBM) [2]. For
the sake of brevity we mention our model results
with NOBM scenarios in this article.
The following subsections describe the
assumptions and behaviors of the market entities
used in our models. Further details of the imple-
mentation of our models can be found in [2].
GENERAL MARKET SETUP AND
MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
The following are the assumptions used in our
models:
• Interference conditions do not impact the
services provided over a unit of traded
spectrum.
Table 1. Types of exchanges.
Exchange type Characteristics
POOL_BM
Pooling point + band manager functionality
• Use of traded spectrum is enabled and configured through equipment/infrastructure owned by the exchange.
• All tradable spectrum is held by the exchange
• All tradable spectrum returns to or is given by the exchange
POOL_NOBM
Pooling point only, no band manager functionality
• Use of traded spectrum is enabled and configured through equipment/infrastructure owned by the exchange.
• Different segments of spectrum can be activated and configured through the equipment/infrastructure of the
exchange
• No spectrum inventory is held by the exchange
NOPOOL_BM
Non-pooling point + band manager functionality
• All tradable spectrum is held by the exchange
• All tradable spectrum returns to or is given by the exchange
• Exchange grants authorizations for use of spectrum (no equipment configuration is done by the exchange)
NOPOOL_NOBM
Non-pooling point, no band manager functionality
• No spectrum inventory is held by the exchange
• Exchange grants authorizations for use of spectrum (no equipment configuration is done by the exchange)
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• Trading takes place over an exchange entity
and over a single geographic service area in
which the wireless services providers (mod-
eled by SU agents) have enough radio base
stations to provide service coverage.
A market scenario is defined by the following
set of parameters:
• Number of market participants (numSU)
• Distribution of spectrum users’ valuation
level (L)
• Amount of available spectrum for trading
(S)
In the market scenarios considered, wireless
service requests manifest to each SU as requests
of traffic to be served for which the SU has to
determine if it has sufficient resources. The SUs
can obtain resources to serve traffic by either
acquiring spectrum in the form of basic band-
width units (BBUs) or using a unit of transmis-
sion of an alternate technology (AT).
Investment in AT transmission units can resem-
ble investing in equipment to make better use of
spectrum already owned by the SU or in wireline
technology, thus avoiding the purchase of addi-
tional BBUs. The choice between BBUs or ATs
will be based on the economic benefit a given SU
might receive from making a selection as it tries to
minimize its costs for providing wireless service.
Each SU will have a fixed price for its choice of
AT unit which does not change during the life of
the market. Thus, if an SU is acting as a spectrum
license requestor (i.e., buyer) when the market
price for a BBU is higher than its AT price, the
SU will buy ATs; and when BBU prices are lower
or equal to its AT price, the SU will buy BBUs.
BEHAVIORS FOR ST MARKET ENTITIES
Spectrum User Behavior — Spectrum users
are the agents that model wireless service pro-
viders (WSPs), and buy and sell spectrum in
order to meet traffic requests (buy) or obtain
economic gain (sell). For our analysis we model
the aggregate traffic demand for each SU within
the ST service area with an exponential distribu-
tion with a mean of μtraffic. The interval between
changes of traffic demand is modeled as an
exponential distribution with a mean of μtchange.
In this model we assume that the traffic demands
faced by SUs are not correlated.
The SUs submit requests to buy (bids) or sell
(asks) to the exchange. The exchange collects
these requests and tries to find the best match
between requests to establish a trade. The SU can
query the exchange for its current market quote,
which contains the minimum ask and maximum
bid price posted in the market. SUs use this infor-
mation in their pricing decisions. Additionally, an
SU can post buy/sell orders that should execute
immediately at the current best price of the mar-
ket (market order) or specify to the exchange its
desire to buy/sell BBUs at the best price possible
but in no event pay/sell for more/less than a speci-
fied limit price (limit orders). If an SU buys AT
units, it is aware that they have a finite lifetime
and should be decommissioned in the future
based on their mean lifetime.
NOBM Spectrum Exchange Behavior — We
assume a continuous order-driven market in
which SUs may trade at any time they choose.
After each order is posted, the exchange updates
its order book, and if a trade can take place, it
transfers the spectrum license from the seller to
the buyer and records the details of the trading
transaction. It also informs the regulator agent
about the trade so that it can keep track of the
owner of each BBU.
After each trade or if there was no trade, the
exchange announces the market quote, informing
market participants of the current market ask
price (best price at which spectrum is being sold
in the market) and the current market bid price
(price of the best offer to buy spectrum in the
market). This allows market participants to
adapt their price behavior to make competitive
bids or asks in the future.
Market Maker — The market maker (MM)
provides liquidity to the market and corrects
market imbalances. In our model the MM agent
stands ready to make bids for spectrum if no SU
is posting a bid, and it posts an offer to sell if no
SU is on the selling side of the market. This
makes the MM a very reactive entity that only
intervenes in the market when there is a severe
imbalance (i.e., no buyers or no sellers) in order
to keep the market alive. Using a simplified MM
allows us to determine which market scenarios
are viable without much economic intervention
from entities that do not provide wireless ser-
vices.
The MM has an initial inventory of BBUs
assigned to it which it uses to keep a bid-ask
(buy-sell) spread present at all times in the mar-
ket. When market intervention by the MM is not
required, the MM will issue a bid or ask with the
objective of getting its spectrum inventory back
to its reference level, which is the same as its ini-
tial spectrum inventory amount.
Regulator Agent — A regulator agent models
a regulator entity, oversees the trades being con-
ducted in the market, and updates a spectrum
assignment database so that ownership of a
given BBU can be verified if needed.
FACTORS FOR ST MARKET VIABILITY
Our focus is on determining the conditions for
viable ST markets with respect to their liquidity
and sustainability characteristics, so we selected
a set of parameters/measures that capture the
main characteristics of these markets.
•Midpoint price for spectrum BBU: This
price gives an indication of the average price at
which a BBU is being valued in the market. Low
values of this measure indicate an excess in sup-
ply or low spectrum demand in the market, while
high values indicate low supply or high demand
for spectrum.
•Relative bid/ask spread: The bid/ask spread
is the difference between the best sell price and
the best buy price in the market. The relative
bid/ask spread is the size of the bid/ask spread
relative to the midpoint price of the quoted
asset. This factor can be used as an indicator of
the liquidity of a market [7,8]. In other words,
high values of this parameter indicate low liquid-
ity in the market, while low values would indi-
cate high liquidity.
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•MM’s BBU inventory difference: This
parameter tracks the difference between the
MM’s current spectrum holdings (BBU invento-
ry) and its reference level of inventory units.
Substantial deviations from the reference level
would indicate problems in the buying or selling
side of the market.
•Percentage of offered spectrum: Expressing
the amount of spectrum being offered for sale as
a percentage of the total spectrum available in
the market, we find that if this percentage is
high, the majority of the tradable spectrum is
not in use by the SUs and thus is being offered
for sale. This would indicate low spectrum effi-
ciency. In general, the lower the value of this
percentage, the more efficiency there is in terms
of spectrum use.
•Number of complete market runs: For the
collection of statistics to analyze each market
scenario, 100 runs of each scenario are per-
formed in SPECTRAD. Activity in a market
starts with a series of mock auctions so that the
SUs can find an initial starting price for trading.
If this initial phase is not successful in finding a
starting price, the market does not proceed to
actual spectrum trading. This factor counts how
many of the attempted market runs were suc-
cessful in finding a stable starting price and thus
able to initiate spectrum trading. It is useful as
an indicator of market viability since a high per-
centage of complete market runs indicates that
initiating trading is feasible and sustainable with-
out difficulty. In contrast, having a low percent-
age of complete market runs would indicate that
the market structure is not well suited to support
sustainable trading.
All of these parameters were found to be
applicable to NOBM markets. A similar analysis
and determination of viability factors was con-
ducted for BM markets, but it is not discussed
here. The reader can find more details on BM
cases in [9].
VIABILITY CRITERIA AND RESULTS
A summary of the values used for the parame-
ters of the market scenarios modeled is shown in
Table 2. Each run of the model was executed for
5000 time ticks of which 3000 were used for the
warm-up period. Data was collected on the last
2000 time ticks.
In the scenarios modeled, the variation of the
tradable spectrum amount and number of SUs
are related in such a way that the value of the
average number of BBUs per spectrum user (R) is
in the set {5, 10, 15, 20, 25}. For all scenarios,
when R is equal to 10, on average every spec-
trum user has enough spectrum to serve its aver-
age traffic requirement value. Thus, R values
lower than 10 indicate an under-supply of spec-
trum, while values greater than 10 indicate an
over-supply of this resource to attend the aver-
age traffic needs of a SU.
In order to determine the viable NOBM mar-
kets based on the factors mentioned in the previ-
ous section, we developed decision criteria to
determine if the behavior of a particular factor
in a market is to be considered as desirable/
acceptable or undesirable/unacceptable. Addi-
tionally, in order to keep track of the aggregate
behavior characteristics of a market, we gave a
score to each factor with a positive value when
the market complies positively with the desired
behavior characteristic or a negative one when it
complies with the undesirable behavior criteria.
Based on the total scores for a market’s behav-
ior, a final list of viable markets was obtained.
Most of the threshold values for each criteri-
on were derived from the simulation data by tak-
Table 2. Parameters for modeled markets.
Parameter Values
Number of spectrum
users (numSU) 4, 5, 6, 10, 20, 50 (this number includes one market maker)
Distribution of spec-
trum users’ valuation
level (L) Table indicates
proportion of spectrum
users at a given valua-
tion level
(willingness to pay)
Dist # Low Medium High
1 1/3 1/3 1/3
2 1/2 1/4 1/4
3 1/4 1/4 1/2
Available spectrum (S)
Values indicate the
number of BBUs avail-
able for trading
5*numSU, 10*numSU, 15*numSU, 20*numSU, 25*numSU.
The amounts of spectrum where chosen for each value of numSU in order to have
R =
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ { }
S
numSU
 in the set     5 10 15 20 25, , , ,
Table 3. Criteria for NOBM market scenario evaluation.
ID Factor Pass (P) Fail (F) Score P/F
C1 Percentage of completed market runs ≥70% ≤50% 2/–2
C2 Relative bid-ask spread ≤20% ≥50% 1/–1
C3 Mid-point BBU price ≥100 ≤25 1/–1
C4 Relative difference of the MM’sinventory to its reference level ≤25% ≥100% 1/–1
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ing into account the values that determine break-
points for different behaviors for a scenario.
Table 3 summarizes the criteria to be used to
evaluate and give scores to the different scenar-
ios studied in this work. Factors such as the per-
centage of completed market runs where given
more weight than other factors given their rela-
tive importance in the determination of viability
characteristics (sustainability in this case).
VIABLE NOBM MARKETS
Using the list of criteria for scenario evaluation
mentioned in Table 3, the scores for the simulat-
ed scenarios are summarized in Fig. 2. We con-
sider markets with scores greater than 0 as
viable. Scenarios with this condition met several
of the desirable conditions for a viable market;
in particular, they all have a percentage of run-
ning markets greater than 50 percent. We only
show the scores for scenarios with user valuation
distribution #1 (as defined in Table 2) since
there was no difference in terms of viable mar-
kets among scenarios with different valuation
level distributions.
Based on the scores, we can say that most of
the viable market scenarios are those that have
R values that meet the condition 5 ≤ R ≤ 10 and
a number of spectrum users (numSU) such that
6 ≤ numSU ≤ 50. When R = 15, the viable sce-
narios are those with 10 ≤ numSU ≤ 20. Figure 3
shows the spectrum efficiency results from our
modeled scenarios.
VIABILITY IMPLICATIONS
NOBM spectrum trading markets are viable
under the criteria used in this work and the ideal
conditions mentioned earlier for markets with
more than 6 spectrum users as long as there is
no oversupply of spectrum, that is, when R = 5
and R = 10 (although cases with 5 SUs were
viable when R = 10).
A value of R = 5 indicates scenarios where
on average there is 50 percent less spectrum per
SU to serve the SU’s average traffic require-
ment. A value of R = 10 is the reference value
where the amount of spectrum per user is very
close to being enough to serve a SU’s average
traffic requirement and is where most of the
viable scenarios are found. When R = 15, there
is a 50 percent oversupply of spectrum and in
this case, the viable markets are those with 10 to
20 spectrum users. Thus, if there is little or no
oversupply of spectrum and with a number of
spectrum users greater than or equal to 6, most
NOBM spectrum trading markets will be viable.
Some of the implications of the results from
the models used in this work are as follows.
Number of Market Participants — Spectrum
trading is viable in markets with no excessive
oversupply or undersupply of spectrum for a
wide range of spectrum user values. However,
when the number of SUs is less than 6, NOBM
markets are unviable. Regulators and entities
interested in these markets must make sure that
enough trading participants will be in the mar-
ket. The results presented here can serve as a
guideline, but should be complemented by fur-
ther study of market environments under differ-
ent traffic (demand) patterns.
Market Makers in a ST Market — Simple
MMs as providers of liquidity, like the ones used
in the models of this work, help in the establish-
ment of viable markets by holding a spectrum
inventory with which they can transact. Thus,
regulators will not have to specify complex MM
behavior requirements or rules. Since an MM
does not make use of its spectrum, assigning too
much inventory to an MM would decrease spec-
trum efficiency. However, the greater the inven-
tory level of the MM, the better prepared it
would be to intervene in the market if there is a
lack of spectrum offerings. Thus, regulators will
need to define the level of spectrum holdings of
an MM to reach a desired balance of market
viability vs. spectrum efficiency.
Amount of Available Spectrum for Trading
— Oversupply of spectrum negatively affected
all market scenarios considered. In particular, an
oversupply of 100 percent above the level of
spectrum the SUs need to serve their average
Figure 2. Scores for NOBM scenarios.
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traffic needs leads to unviable markets. An ade-
quate amount of spectrum for trading should be
made available in the market in order to main-
tain trading activity. Our scenarios showed via-
bility with spectrum amounts 50 percent above
or below the level of spectrum needed to attend
average traffic in the market.
Spectrum Efficiency — In the viable ST mar-
ket scenarios, NOBM markets provided for spec-
trum efficiencies between 51 and 77 percent
under the ideal conditions of this work. These
results show a positive characteristic of ST mar-
kets that is of great interest to regulators and
SUs. Analysis of spectrum efficiency in other
market scenarios and conditions is left for future
work.
CONCLUSIONS
The outcomes of our study can help policy mak-
ers and wireless service providers (future and cur-
rent) understand the required conditions for
implementing spectrum trading markets. The
market and operational scenarios we used
assumed ideal conditions among which were the
use of a single wireless technology and the fungi-
bility of spectrum in the service area where ST
was operating. These restrictions were used to
define initial scenarios (almost ideal) over which
to study the dynamics of spectrum trading. Future
work will make use of our modeling tool (SPEC-
TRAD) to analyze more complicated scenarios.
Our models indicate that spectrum markets
can be viable if sufficient numbers of market
participants exist and the amount of tradable
spectrum is balanced to the demand. Given that
a minimum of five to six active spectrum users
(wireless service providers) are necessary in a
particular service area, it seems unlikely that
spectrum markets will be viable in mobile mar-
kets unless the barriers to market entry for new
service providers are lowered. ST markets may
well create the incentive for the appearance of
new types of wireless service providers, but with-
out a truly liberalized ST market in place it is
unlikely they will do so. Thus, a challenge for
regulators and researchers alike will be identify-
ing an appropriate band to promote spectrum
trading or to facilitate the entry of new market
participants, and perhaps even end users.
The matter of balancing tradable spectrum to
demand will prove more challenging for regula-
tors because this requires insight into service
demand, even though this need not be too pre-
cise. Thus, it will be important to develop useful
(and observable) proxies that enable regulators
to estimate how well markets are balanced. The
viability of spectrum trading in more complicat-
ed trading scenarios (i.e., more than one wireless
standard and/or non-fungible spectrum) is left
for future work.
An important byproduct of our research is
demonstrating how ACE can be applied to the
study of telecommunication markets. Our meth-
ods and tools can be extended to the study of
other telecommunications markets or scenarios
where adaptive behaviors of the system partici-
pants are allowed and studying the emergent
behavior of the market is of interest.
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